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FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
In Re Marriage of Witten: Subordinating Contract to "Public Policy"
NANCY S. Km*
In re Marriage of Witten' is a case about a divorcing couple fighting
over the fate of frozen embryos.' It is a sad case-divorce cases usually
are. It is also a good example of a bad contracts case.
Tamera and Trip Witten were a married couple who hoped to start
a family. Eventually, they turned to in vitro fertilization (IVF). After
seven-and-a-half years of marriage and several unsuccessful IVF at-
tempts, Trip filed for divorce. At issue was whether Tamera Witten
could use one of the seventeen frozen embryos which were in storage
at the University of Nebraska Medical Center (UNMC). Tamera tes-
tified that if she were able to have a child using one of the embryos,
she would give Trip the option of exercising or terminating his paren-
tal rights.3 In other words, she was not asking him to be a co-parent
or to be involved in supporting or raising the child; she was merely
opposed to destroying or donating the embryos. Trip, however, did
not oppose donating the embryos to another couple-he just did not
want Tamera to use them.4
Before starting the IVF process, the Wittens had signed docu-
ments prepared by the UNMC, including the "Embryo Storage
Agreement," which contained a provision that the embryos would be
released "only with the signed approval of both Client Depositors."5
UNMC's obligation to store the embryos would terminate if the par-
ties died, if they authorized the destruction of the embryos, if they
failed to pay the annual storage fee, or if ten years passed after the
date of the agreement.6
On appeal, Tamera argued that the storage agreement was silent
with respect to what would happen to the embryos in the event that
the parties divorced. In other words, she was making an "omitted
terms" argument. But rather than arguing for an interpretation
based upon the intent of the parties, she argued that an Iowa statute
should apply to award her "custody" of the embryos. That Iowa stat-
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1. 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003).
2. As the court noted, the "embryo[s]" were likely "pre-zygotes" or "preembryos." Id.
at 772 n.I. However, the court used the term "embryo" because that was the term used in
the Witten's contract with UNMC. Id. Because the court adopted the term "embryo," I do so
for the purposes of this essay.
3. Id. at 772.
4. Id. at 772-73.
5. Id. at 772.
6. Id.
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ute set forth various standards which courts should use to determine
the custody of children in divorce proceedings.7
As the court noted, Tamera was essentially arguing that "the em-
bryos are children and their best interest demands placement with
her." Trip, on the other hand, argued that "the frozen embryos are
not children and should not be considered as such" under Iowa law.9
Tamera's argument thus boxed the court into a politically uncomfort-
able corner. In order for the court to rule in her favor, the court
would have had to find, at least by implication, that embryos were
equivalent to children. Because Tamera's argument was based on
policy rather than contract, the court was forced to base its interpre-
tation on legislative intent rather than on the reasonable expecta-
tions of the parties.
The court considered the legislative purpose underlying the rele-
vant statute and concluded that "the legislature did not intend to in-
clude fertilized eggs or frozen embryos within the scope" of the rele-
vant law.'o Tamera also made the argument that the contract violated
public policy because it allowed a participant in an IVF program to re-
nege on an agreement o become a parent." But rather than argue on
the basis of detrimental reliance, Tamera again strayed into volatile
territory by trying to convince the court that it was against public poli-
cy to enforce an agreement which allowed "a donor to abandon [IVF]
attempts when viable embryos remain."2 The court pushed back
against this argument, again making a distinction between "children
who have been born" and "fertilized eggs that have not even resulted
in a pregnancy."3 The court's decision on these two points is wise in
light of how Tamera framed the issue. The court simply could not side
with her without also equating embryos with children-something
which would likely have unfortunate implications given the political
heat which surrounds the right to abortion. The court noted that the
power to invalidate a contract on public policy grounds must be exer-
cised "cautiously and only in cases free from doubt."' 4
But then the court turned its back on contract law in favor of pub-
lic policy in the area of reproduction: "We think, however, that it
would be against the public policy of this state to enforce a prior
agreement between the parties in this highly personal area of repro-
7. Id. at 774-74.
8. Id. at 774.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 776.
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ductive choice when one of the parties has changed his or her mind
concerning the disposition or use of the embryos."1 5
The court noted that family and reproductive decisions are "emo-
tional in nature and subject to a later change of heart"6 and thus con-
cluded that judicial enforcement of contracts between couples on "fu-
ture family and reproductive choices would be against . . . public poli-
cy."' 7 It then noted that agreements between donors and fertility clin-
ics, however, were enforceable.'8 The court jettisoned the ability of cou-
ples to enter into contracts involving matters of family planning in fa-
vor of a "contemporaneous mutual consent" model which allows either
party to change his or her mind. This no-contract approach ignores one
of the primary purposes of contracts-to assist in planning for the fu-
ture and to encourage acts of reliance that are a necessary part of such
a planning process. Furthermore, the contemporaneous mutual con-
sent model completely ignores the inherently unequal nature of the
IVF process. It is the woman who bears the painful, physical burdens
which the process involves. Thus, it is the woman who will undertake
acts of detrimental reliance upon a promise to participate in the IVF
process. The woman is also the one who feels more keenly the effects of
time on fertility. Often, as it was in the case of Tamera and Trip, it is
also the woman who would be financially unable to undergo another
round of IVF procedures after a divorce." The contemporaneous mutu-
al consent model presumes an equality which just does not exist when
it comes to the IVF process.
The court held that "there can be no use or disposition of the Wit-
tens' embryos unless Trip and Tamera reach an agreement."2 0 It then
added, either cluelessly or mean-spiritedly, that the party who op-
poses destruction of the embryos is responsible for storage fees.2' The
court's decision thus put Tamera in the humiliating position of trying
to wheedle consent from Trip while continuing to make payments to
keep the eggs in storage.
On the first day of class, I tell my contracts students about the
bargain principle. I tell them that, with a few caveats, courts will not
review the adequacy of consideration or the fairness of contractual
15. Id. at 781.
16. Id. at 782.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Trip's income was "substantially larger" than Tamera's. Id. at 784. According to
documents submitted to the court, Tamera earned $3,087, $3069, $0 and $15,623.27 during
the years 1999, 2000, and 2001, respectively. See Respondent-Appellant's/Cross-Appellee's
Reply Brief at 2, In re Witten, 672 N.W. 2d 768 (2003) (No. 03-0551), 2003 WL 24314608.
20. Witten, 672 N.W. 2d at 783.
21. Id. at 784-85. The court also overturned the trial court's order that Trip pay Tam-
era cash for her share of his retirement account. Id. at 785.
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terms. Contract law is about autonomy, individualism, and freedom.
Contract law is tough, I say; it expects you to say what you mean and
mean what you say.
But students soon learn that the law is full of qualifiers and ex-
ceptions. Contract law, it turns out, is not so tough after all. The
most obvious examples of contract law's compassionate side are un-
conscionability, duress, and the changed circumstances doctrines.
But flexibility is an integral part of every aspect of contract law. Con-
sideration, mistakes, good faith and fair dealing, interpretation
standards-every contract doctrine has nestled within it some expec-
tation of fairness-some ceding to context and social norms of decen-
cy. To calm the skittish who fear the slippery slope, "fairness" and
"justice" often masquerade as "reasonableness" and "good faith."
Nevertheless, wise judges understand that there are some bargains
which should not be upheld, and conversely, that there are some
promises which must be kept. The equitable doctrines also play their
part. Promissory estoppel, quasi contract, restitution, moral obliga-
tion-these contractual kin accomplish their goals to the extent nec-
essary to avoid injustice.22
In re Witten relegates contracts to second-class status. Much of the
blame lies with Tamera's legal counsel. Tamera's arguments about
"custody" of fertilized eggs and a "fundamental right" to pregnancy
ring alarm bells for anyone concerned about abortion rights and re-
productive freedom. It is not difficult to imagine that the court made
its ruling with a worried eye to those who might use the case for po-
litical ends. But by expressly dismissing the power of contracts in the
realm of intimate relations and ignoring the flexibility of contract
doctrines to fulfill reasonable expectations and prevent injustice, the
Witten court went too far and diminished reproductive freedom. Cou-
ples make promises to each other all the time. Sometimes, those
promises result in acts of heartbreaking reliance. Contract law and
its equitable kin allow judicial enforcement of promises in such cases.
In re Witten should have been one of those cases.
22. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §86 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (stat-
ing that a promise made in recognition of a benefit conferred bindes the promisee "to the
extent necessary to prevent injustice"); Id. §89 (modification without consideration binding
"to the extent that justice requires enforcement"); Id. §90 (promise which induces reasona-
ble detrimental reliance is binding "if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise").
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